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ABSTRACT 
 
Mobile phones have been playing a very significant role in our daily activities for the last 
decade. With the increase need for these devices, people are now more reliant on their 
smartphone applications for their daily tasks and many prefer to save their mobile data on a 
cloud platform to access them anywhere on any device. Cloud technology is the new way for 
better data storage, as it offers better security, more flexibility, and mobility. Many 
smartphones have been investigated as subjects, objects or tools of the crime. Many of these 
investigations include analysing data stored through cloud storage apps which contributes to 
importance of cloud apps forensics on mobile devices. In this paper, various cloud Android 
applications are analysed using the forensics tool XRY and a forensics taxonomy for 
investigation of these apps is suggested. The proposed taxonomy reflects residual artefacts 
retrievable from 31 different cloud applications. It is expected that the proposed taxonomy 
and the forensic findings in this paper will assist future forensic investigations involving 
cloud based storage applications. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Mobile applications have increasingly adopted the Android operating system as a standard, 
with backing from market share figures, 82.8% of smartphones have incorporated the 
Android operating system (Hornyak, 2014). These statistics and features highlight the 
importance and relevance of the Android OS for smartphone manufacturers worldwide 
(Kumar & Xie, 2012). Android operating system has amassed over 1.4 billion users 
worldwide as of 2016 according to the Google CEO (Vincent, 2015) this is due to its wide 
acceptability and increased usage amongst the world’s mobile phone populace (Stevenson, 
2014). Cloud computing is an umbrella under which majority of internet related services are 
classified. Many cloud applications are increasingly developed for Android platform and 
many Android applications are now running through cloud services (Tee, 2012). Therefore, 
more attacks are directed against Android platforms through cloud services or cloud 
applications vulnerabilities (Ganji, Dehghantanha, & IzuraUdzir, 2013a). As the use of 
technology has afforded substantial breakthroughs in investigative cases, it is now required 
that the forensic investigators be able to acquire and analyse persistent data, volatile data and 
other sensitive information from different platforms (Damshenas & Dehghantanha, 2014). 
Many investigation tools were developed to assist acquisition, collation, and analysis of data 
in ways that maintain the chain of evidence (Massie, 2014). Mobile forensic investigators are 
required to integrate technology and law in investigation of many traditional crimes such as 
drug dealing, copyright infringement, etc, which are facilitated by mobile and cloud 
technologies (Mohsen Damshenas, Ali Dehghantanha, Ramlan Mahmoud, 2013; Yusoff, 
Mahmod, & Abdullah, 2014). Audio files, images, videos, messages, notes and emails are 
just a few possible remnants that can be extracted during mobile investigations from social 
networking, instant messaging and cloud and mobile platforms (Aminnezhad & 
Dehghantanha, 2013; Daryabar et al., 2016; Seyedhossein Mohtasebi & Dehghantanha, 2011; 
SH Mohtasebi, 2011; Yang, Dehghantanha, Choo, & Muda, 2016). As the cyber world 
becomes heavily reliant on mobile and cloud storage technologies, it is only palpable that 
these two mediums would experience the most cyber-attacks and intrusion attempts as they 
hold vital information of the concerned organizations or individuals (Farid Daryabar, Ali 
Dehghantanha, Nur Izura Udzir, Nor Fazlida binti Mohd Sani, 2013). 
 Methods, techniques and strategies must be implemented to not only defend or protect these 
mediums but also to ensure their forensics readiness (Mohsen Damshenas, Ali Dehghantanha, 
Ramlan Mahmoud, 2013). The fast pace of change in mobile and cloud technologies 
mandates utilising many different tools and techniques for investigation of these platforms 
(Daryabar & Ali Dehghantanha, Nur Izura Udzir, Nor Fazlida binti Mohd Sani, 2013). 
Previous researchers (A Azfar, Choo, & Liu, 2016; Abdullah Azfar, Choo, & Liu, 2015a, 
2015b) have carried out experiment on applications to determine what user information or 
activity the average applications collects with a view to improving the forensic understanding 
of the tested applications by creating taxonomies from their studies.  
The taxonomy created in this paper would aid in investigation of cloud based storage 
applications and reflect residual artefacts of 31 different cloud apps on an android mobile 
 device which aids in correlation of evidences between user’s activities and remnants of cloud 
applications resided on the device.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows, firstly, the experiment set-up which 
details the cloud storage applications, environment, devices and operating systems used. 
Secondly, results and discussion which illustrates our findings and end results of this 
experiment. Finally, the paper is concluded and several future researches are suggested. 
EXPERIMENT SETUP 
 
In order to select cloud storage application that would cover majority of users, two major 
criteria were considered, targeting free applications and also the user ratings for the cloud 
storage applications. This gives basis for strong and efficient cloud storage application 
taxonomy to be developed. Free applications were selected as majority of users would rather 
download the free cloud storage application as they do not require commercial services. In 
return of search query “cloud storage applications” 240 free Cloud storage applications were 
shortlisted and only 31 were selected from these based on their user ratings and download 
numbers(Falk & Shyshka, 2014a). 31 applications which best fit the selection criterial were 
chosen. 31 cloud storage applications are deemed adequate in accordance with previous 
works (Yang et al., 2016) in the forensic investigation of cloud storage services.  
 
The selected applications can be found in appendix 1.In this paper, Android cloud storage 
applications were examined using the popular forensics tool MicroSystemation XRY (version 
6.16.0) from MSAB on a Windows operating system (Win 10 Pro). Cloud storage 
applications were sourced from Google Play Store. Applications selected are all available and 
free to download. The applications were picked out from a pool of over 240 cloud 
applications (the total number of cloud applications on google play as at 10/03/2016) 
however the scope of this project only focuses on cloud-storage based applications.  
 
A sheer number of users utilise those popular apps daily, analysing those apps would cover a 
high percentage of possible cases that may require forensics investigation, there might be a 
good chance to examine vulnerabilities that could be exploited by cyber criminals under any 
circumstances. When investigating mobile devices that are likely to contain data which could 
be decisive in criminal investigations or which can be presented as forensic evidence, it is 
expected that files and applications that have been executed or transferred on the mobile 
devices can still be accessed if the need arises. Files and data on devices can still be retrieved 
from mobile device even after they have been deleted. The data extraction tool has the 
capability to pull out data that has been removed on various applications depending on the 
security and technological level of the application.   
 
XRY (version 6.16.0) is installed on the machine in order to carry out the forensic extraction 
and analysis legally. The Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet was used for the running and analysis 
of the selected android cloud storage applications. The analysis was conducted on Android 
operating system version KitKat (4.4.4) due to the difficulty the XRY tool encountered trying 
 to capture after upgrading Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet to the latest Android version 
Marshmallow (6.0.1). A version downgrade was required in order to resolve this issue, the 
downgrade was done using Nexus root Toolkit (2.4.1) (Nammi, 2014). 
 
Factory reset was carried out after examining each cloud storage application, this was done to 
ensure that no interferences or mix up from previously examined applications was recorded 
as part of the result for the subsequent application examined. This technique also eliminated 
the possibility of any dataset remnants from the previous examined application will not be 
carried over to subsequent data extractions thereby guaranteeing a more accurate 
investigation. 
 
The Nexus Root Toolkit (2.4.1) was used for the rooting of the Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet, 
this toolkit is widely used for rooting Nexus devices and furthermore as XRY was unable to 
automatically root the device (Mushcab & Gladyshev, 2015). Operating system vendors have 
restriction on the privileges, access and rights that normal users do not have the 
authentication to access so in order to gain maximum privileges and full control of the 
Android operating system (Android 4.4.4 (KitKat)). This would allow access with root 
privileges, applications on the device can now run with privileged commands hereby giving 
access to control the CPU and Kernel of the device (Swift, 2015).  
 
In order to sniff only network traffic generated by the examined applications and not by other 
services and programs running in the background, an separated hotspot was created in order 
to avoid interference from devices or applications on the same network. Similar to authors of 
previous works (Park, Choi, Eom, & Chung, 2014) in creating a hotspot in order to meet this 
very important pre requisite. The Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet was placed on a separate 
network established using Connectify (2016.0.3.36821 Pro) which allowed having a hotspot 
with specific IP addresses and this separated the Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet’s IP address 
from the local network. It must be exclusively network traffic between the applications and 
their communications between the Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet, and the server on an isolated 
network.  
 
As done in previous researches (Ashraf, 2013; Lo, Qian, Chen, & Rogers, 2015) Connectify 
was used to set up a hotspot connection, which connects the tablet to the laptop and separates 
it from the main local network, the laptop then works as a server or a gateway for the Asus 
Nexus 7 Google tablet and hence making it easier to monitor the traffic sent from the Asus 
Nexus 7 Google tablet to the server. Wireshark (2.0.2) was used to monitor and capture the 
traffic of the Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet on that specific connection. The IP address of the 
Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet is fixed (192.168.121.103) as used for this project. This IP 
address would serve as the source while the IP address of the server is (192.168.121.1) as it 
works as a gateway for the Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet. Wireshark (2.0.2) has also been used 
by (Ashraf, 2013) for sniffing network traffic in similar forensic work. 
For appraisal of data extracted by the XRY tool for this experiment, a forensic dataset was 
chosen and files were selected based on certain criteria and utilized for the purpose of the 
 experiment. The chosen files were adopted as exhibits that would be uploaded for every 
cloud storage application. This gives a fair and accurate ground that the files and documents 
used are of optimal integrity and were compromised to alter results. We chose the EDRM 
dataset which provides industry standard reference dataset of electronically stored 
information (ESI) used for forensic and other e-discovery works (EDRM, 2010). Specifically 
11 files of different formats and extension, the files chosen were based on the need to cover 
the most common file extensions and types which cater to different media and document 
contents. In line with works by authors Dehghantanha, A Daryabar, F. et al. (Daryabar et al., 
2016) who made use of the EDRM dataset in their forensic research on similar cloud storage 
applications. The dataset is exhibited in the appendix 2 of this paper.  
DISCUSSION 
Extracted data from each application were examined and the datasets were identified, 
presented and documented. These traces, effects and remnants of the files together with other 
activities or action by the cloud storage application on the Asus Nexus 7 Google tablet were 
tabulated. 
 
The reason behind choosing the corresponding multimedia files for this experiment, is due to 
the fact that forensics investigators usually tend to capture multimedia remnants from the 
suspect’s device, this will most probably be used as a proof of evidence in the court, files like 
images and audio files contain a lot of sensitive data, one image could simply open or close 
the case. Documents are of a high importance too, in the real world, many leaked documents 
contained a sheer amount of sensitive data, and that is due to lack of proper security for these 
documents. Having put documents of certain information in this experiment, helped us track 
that information while searching for the documents’ remnants among the extracted data. 
Often when the documents are deleted, they leave behind some remnants which sometimes 
can be in a readable format, even though the data may not be complete, it sometimes gives an 
indication on what the full information was. Supposedly, in a real life’s forensics 
investigation process, a suspect’s device is used to store a couple of documents on the cloud, 
any retrieved information from the document file may hold a high amount of valuable 
information that could be presented as a proof of evidence. 
 
Internal storage contains installed applications and their data are stored on mobile devices 
and sometimes they leave some remnants, this information can be potentially sensitive or 
incriminating therefore they play a pivotal role in the forensics investigation of suspected 
mobile devices in cases of law prosecution and forensic investigations of such devices.  
 
Internal memory though volatile in nature, is much faster to write to and read from in 
comparison with other forms of storage such as hard disk drives. Data in the internal memory 
normally remains intact while the device is powered on but loses it when the power goes off 
(Microsoft, 2006). This previously hindered forensic investigation of such part of the memory 
but with the advent of tools such as XRY it is now possible to recover some of this data 
 through acquisition. This is also shown in Appendix 3 in the remnants column (those 
remnants were found in the internal storage as cache files) 
 
Network analysis is important to monitor, capture and analyse network traffic packets which 
hold network information. The network analysis provides investigators with relevant IP 
addresses, ports, protocols and URL’s assessed by the cloud storage applications as well as 
attempted connections (Shimonski, 2013). This can prove to be vital information in tracing 
criminal activities. Appendix 4 depicts some of the network traffic observed when these 
applications were sharing files on the internet. 
 
The protocols used by these applications were identified and listed with check marks 
denoting which application makes use of which protocols; these can be crucial for forensic 
investigating and ethical hacking of devices and networks. The UDP stream from the DNS 
and MDNS show paths taken by some application when users upload content unto the cloud 
via their application, these paths can be used varying and specifically based on the motive for 
investigation, analysis or monitoring network traffic.  The streams give a little insight into the 
kinds of information that these applications generate as they peruse the networks and store 
user content on the cloud platforms. As shown in Appendix 4 some of the applications 
display the paths they take during installation, registration and running of services. Few 
applications leave traces in plain text of their origin website, which is likely to be the 
provider which hosts these cloud services.  
 
RESULTS 
The applications examined share a similar criteria, each application stores data on the cloud 
so it could be accessible by the user either from the phone (device) or using a website (in 
most cases). Some applications selected use a third party cloud service in order to store data 
on the cloud, which may come in handy especially when the app offers other services like 
managing files or exploring the phone’s storage.  
Typically, each application requires a sign up in order to use its cloud service, and for most 
applications, we were able to upload data on the cloud from their home website. 
For better results, we ensured that the dataset was uploaded to the cloud service using a 
different device other than the tablet, to avoid having remnants from the internal storage 
interfering with the data retrieved from the application itself, even though XRY lists out the 
data found and the path of where the data was found particularly. Remnants found on 
/mnt/sdcard/ are discarded, for some applications the dataset sample was transferred directly 
to the tablet, and then uploaded to the cloud application, which is why some remnants could 
be recovered from that particular path and not from the app itself. 
Database  
When extracting the data, we noticed that some applications generated db files and stored 
them in a particular path within the internal storage, among the experimented applications, 15 
 apps generated db  files in the internal memory, and the following is a list of the apps along 
with the paths where the db  files were stored: 
 File Expert /data/data/xcxin.fehd/databases/ 
 GCloud /data/data/com.genie9.gcloudbackup/databases/ 
 Mail.Ru /data/data/ru.mail.cloud/databases/ 
 Cloud Magic /data/data/com.cloudmagic.mail/databases/ 
 Degoo  /data/data/com.degoo.android/databases/ 
 Pcloud  /data/data/com.pcloud.pcloud/databases/ 
 XXL Box /data/data/com.xxlcloud.xxlbox/databases/ 
 ZeroPC /data/data/com.zeropc.tablet/databases/ 
 File Manager /data/data/fm.clean/databases/ 
 4Sync Cloud /data/data/com.forsync/databases/ 
 Asus Web /data/data/com.ecareme.asuswebstorage/databases/ 
 FileBay.co /data/data/com.sflcnetwork.filebayco/databases/ 
 Folder Sync /data/data/dk.tacit.android.foldersync.lite/databases/ 
 MyCloud  /data/data/com.wdc.wd2go/databases/ 
 Pogoplug /data/data/com.wdc.wd2go/databases/  
 
The applications intended here are under both groups 2 and 3, as applications from Group 1 
did not generate any db files. 
Notice that the path for this particular file, always shows same directory names: 
“data/data/generated_file_name/databases/” this kind of paths is inaccessible to the user. 
Check Appendix3 for more information on the applications and their db files. 
Storage 
The artefacts retrieved from the dataset are usually found on the internal storage folder which 
is accessible by the user, such as the pictures folder, the music folder and so on. A good 
observation would be that some images were not retrieved and yet their thumbnails were, and 
from a simple thumbnail a lot of information may be obtained during the forensics 
investigation process, it may not show all the details as the number of pixels in thumbnails is 
obviously much lower than the those of an original image, however, using some image 
processing tools, a lot of evidence could be extracted from a simple thumbnail. 
The following lists the findings of the extracted data within the internal storage, which 
includes Pictures, Documents, Audio files, and Web files. 
- Pictures 
We were able to retrieve images from some applications, as mentioned before, those retrieved 
images may not have the same size, resolution and file details as the original ones, however, 
those images were viewable, and are enough to be shown as evidence for forensics 
 investigation purposes. The following applications showed recovered artefacts (i.e. original 
pictures, thumbnails, cache images): 
 Box 
 GCloud 
 Mail.Ru 
 Cloud Magic 
 Just Cloud 
 XXL Box Secure  
 Zero PC 
 File Manager 
 ZipCloud 
 Folder Sync Lite 
 MyCloud 
See Appendix 3 for the full list of applications and their respective findings. 
 
 
 
- Documents 
For some applications, the following documents were retrieved from the internal storage and 
were in a readable format too: .doc, .pot and .pdf. Most apps did not show any retrieved 
document files during the extraction, except for a minority of apps, those are as follow: 
 Cloud Magic 
 XXL Box Secure 
 File Manager 
 DropSend Android Cloud 
 Folder Sync Lite 
 MyCloud 
 
- Web Files  
A variety of applications stored web files from the correspondent dataset used in the 
experiment (.xml and .html) in the internal storage and hence it was retrievable and 
readable too. The apps are as follow: 
 XXL Box Secure 
 File Manager 
 Zip Cloud 
 DropSend Android 
  Folder Sync Lite 
 MyCloud 
 
- Audio  
The audio file from the selected dataset was recovered from a minority of applications only 
and was playable, those applications are: 
 Just Cloud 
 XXL Box Secure 
 File Manager 
 Folder Sync Lite 
 My Cloud 
Upon analysing the extracted data, the path of the retrieved audio file showed the following: 
“mnt/sdcard” that is an evidence of the existence of data or artefact on the internal storage of 
the device, and is accessible by the user. While the path “/data/data/” may not be accessible 
by a regular user, but that is not the case for any forensic investigator examining the device 
for evidence. Appendix 3 illustrates these results and clarifies the retrieved files for each of 
the 31 applications.  
As a conclusion to these results, we can state that based on the amount of files retrieved from 
each app in this experiment we could categorise them into 3 groups according to how much 
data (artefact) was recovered, the first group of applications showed no recovered data on 
XRY, which we will classify in this paper as (Group 1), while some applications generated 
database files in the internal storage only while the files from the dataset were not recovered, 
we call this group (Group 2), and finally (Group 3) showed database files as well as most of 
the data stored in the cloud was retrieved. As shown in Table 1, cloud applications used in 
this experiment can be categorised into 3 groups. 
 
 
Applications Classification  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Box File Expert Mail.Ru 
DropBox Degoo GCloud 
Google Drive PCloud Cloud Magic 
Adobe Creative Cloud 4Sync Cloud Just Cloud 
One Drive Asus Web Storage Cloud XXL Box Secure 
Yandex FileBay.co ZeroPC 
Tesorit PogoPlug Cloud File Manager 
Egnyte  Zip Cloud 
Bitcasa  Drop Send Android Cloud 
IDrive Cloud  Folder Sync Lite 
JohoSpace  My Cloud (WD) 
Mega Cloud   
  
Table 1: Classification of apps based on this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Classification of data in this experiment 
 
The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the classification of data recovered during this taxonomy 
forensics experiment, some applications showed a lot of recovered data, while others showed 
no trace of those files, this diagram facilitates an understanding on how to categorise and 
tabulate the data recovered. This Taxonomy was coined from the intricate analysing of the 
recovered remnant from the extraction processes. It is a comprehensive and relevant 
taxonomy in the field of cyber cloud forensics. This is depicted in the detailed results and 
discussions sections of this paper.  
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CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORKS 
Mobile Forensics, and specifically Android Forensics, continues to be a growing field of 
research. As the Android platform and its architectures continue to evolve, the current 
research will facilitate forensic investigators in recovering sources of evidence (Martini, Do, 
& Choo, 2015a, 2015b; Shariati, Dehghantanha, Martini, & Choo, 2015). 
The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to the forensics field and particularly the 
Android mobile forensics. With a taxonomy experiment on Android cloud applications, we 
deem its necessity in this particular area of research as the taxonomy for cloud applications is 
minimal. Using the taxonomy and forensics model, we conducted a fundamental analysis on 
31 popular cloud applications; the findings are tabulated and presented appropriately in the 
Appendix section. 
Finally, as part of our future work, we intend to examine other cloud applications on other 
platforms (i.e. IOS) and devices, and push the investigation by performing physical data 
acquisition on those apps in order to capture dumps from the device’s memory which may 
lead to even more promising findings. However, more research is still needed in order to 
provide better directions on addressing different challenges of mobile forensics, and prompt 
further discussion on the development of different forensic taxonomies in variety of contexts. 
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 APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 – List of Application versions. 
App ID. App Name App Version 
1. Box 3.7.5 
2. File Expert 7.1.8 
3. GCloud 5.4.95 
4. Mail.Ru 4.4.0.15562 
5. MEO Cloud 2.1.0 
6. Cloud Magic 8.1.32 
7. Drop Box 5.2.6 
8. Degoo 1.9.7 
9. One Drive 3.9.1 
10. Just Cloud 1.2.4 
11. PCloud 1.12.05 
12. XXL Box Secure 1.0.2 
13. ZeroPC 2.5.5 
14. File Manager 4.0.4.9 
15. ZipCloud 1.2.4 
16. 4Sync Cloud 3.27.0 
17. Adobe Creative Cloud 2.3.460 
18. Asus Web Storage Cloud 3.1.8.0408 
19. Bitcasa Drive 4.25.5 
20. DropSend Android Cloud 1.0.0-rc6 
21. Egnyte 6.8.5 
22. FileBay.co Secure Storage 1.0 
23. Foldersync Lite 2.8.5.90 
24. IDrive Cloud Online Backup 3.6.32 
 25. JohoSpace Backup – Restore & Migrate 3.6.3 
26. Mega Cloud 3.0.6.official 
27. MyCLoud (WD) 4.4.3 
28. Pogoplug Cloud 5.11.0.19 
29. Tesorit Cloud 2.1.386.443 
30. Yandex Disk 2.65 
31. Google Drive 2.4.141.16.34 
 
Appendix 2 – Dataset List (EDRM) 
Dataset 
ID 
File Name and Extension File Type 
1. Student-Documentation.pdf PDF Document 
2. Malaventura_-_12_The_Queen.mp3 Media File Audio 
3. IMG_3084.jpg JPEG Image 
4. IMG_3085.jpg JPEG Image 
5. EDRM.html HTML Document 
6. Disposing-of-Digital-Debris-Information-
Governance-Practice-and-
Strategy_Page_02.tif 
TIFF Image 
7. Disposing-of-Digital-Debris-Information-
Governance-Practice-and-
Strategy_Page_05.tif 
TIFF Image 
8. Disposing of Digital Debris Sample 1.pot Microsoft PowerPoint Document 
9. Disposing of Digital Debris – 97.doc Microsoft Word Document 
10. DERM Statistical Data Sample 1 
Unicode.xml 
XML Document 
11. Cindyloh3333@gmail.com.mbox MBOX e-mail file 
 Appendix 3 – Retrieved Artefacts 
App 
ID 
App name DB Files Path JPEG  TIF  DOC POT PDF XML HTML Mp3 MBOX 
1. Box N/A N/A          
2. File Expert FileExpert.db /data/data/xcxin.feh
d/databases/ 
         
3. GCloud GCloudDB, db_music, 
db_video, syncdata.db 
/data/data/com.geni
e9.gcloudbackup/dat
abases/ 
         
4. Mail.Ru adman.db, 
isp.taxonomy@mail.ru, 
google_analytics_v4.db 
/data/data/ru.mail.cl
oud/databases/ 
         
5. MEO Cloud N/A N/A          
6. Cloud Magic google_analytics_v2.db /data/data/com.clou
dmagic.mail/databas
es/ 
         
7. Drop Box N/A N/A          
8. Degoo google_analytics_v4.db /data/data/com.deg
oo.android/database
s/ 
         
9. One Drive N/A N/A          
10. Just Cloud N/A N/A          
11. PCloud PCloudDB, 
PCloudDB_wal, 
PCloudDB_shm, 
google_analytics_v4.db 
/data/data/com.pclo
ud.pcloud/databases
/ 
         
 12. XXL Box 
Secure 
Monitor.db, data.db, 
account.db 
/data/data/com.xxlcl
oud.xxlbox/database
s/ 
         
13. ZeroPC com.zeropc.tablet.queu
e.db, 
com.zeropc.tablet.cach
e.db 
/data/data/com.zero
pc.tablet/databases/ 
         
14. File 
Manager 
clanfilemanager.db, 
google_tagmanager.db, 
google_analytics_v4.db 
/data/data/fm.clean
/databases/ 
         
15. ZipCloud N/A N/A          
16. 4Sync Cloud Cloud.db, 
sdk4.uploads.db, 
sdk4.uploads.db-shm, 
sdk4.uploads.db-wal, 
google_analytics_v4.db 
/data/data/com.fors
ync/databases/ 
         
17. Adobe 
Creative 
Cloud 
N/A N/A          
18. Asus Web 
Storage 
Cloud 
AWS.db, awsbackup /data/data/com.ecar
eme.asuswebstorage
/databases/ 
         
19. Bitcasa 
Drive 
N/A N/A          
20. DropSend 
Android 
Cloud 
N/A N/A          
21. Egnyte N/A N/A          
22. FileBay.co 
Secure 
Storage 
google_analytics_v4.db /data/data/com.sflcn
etwork.filebayco/dat
abases/ 
         
 23. Foldersync 
Lite 
foldersync.db /data/data/dk.tacit.a
ndroid.foldersync.lit
e/databases/ 
         
24. IDrive Cloud 
Online 
Backup 
N/A N/A          
25. JohoSpace 
Backup- 
Restore & 
Migrate 
N/A N/A          
26. Mega Cloud N/A N/A          
27. MyCLoud 
(WD) 
wd-files-demo-
cache.db, wd-files-
cache.db 
/data/data/com.wdc
.wd2go/databases/ 
         
28. Pogoplug 
Cloud 
VISUALS, POGOPLUG /data/data/com.pog
oplug.android/datab
ases/ 
         
29. Tesorit 
CLoud 
N/A N/A          
30. Yandex Disk N/A 
 
N/A          
31. Google 
Drive 
N/A N/A          
 
 
  
 Appendix 4 – Network Traffic 
Applications Protocols Used Relevant Stream Data 
App ID App name TCP MDNS DNS MDNS DNS 
1. Box 
   
._googlecast._tcp.local
.................._goog
lecast._tcp.local.. 
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 
Host:239.255.255.250:19
00 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaRendere
r:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
2. File Expert 
   
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 
Host:[FF02::C]:1900 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaRendere
r:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
3. GCloud 
   
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 
Host:239.255.255.250:19
00 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaRendere
r:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-
1ed85ce82f5d::upnp:rootdevice 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: upnp:rootdevice 
 4. Mail.Ru     (UDP stream): ......cloclo12.datacloudmail.ru....... 
5. MEO Cloud      
6. Cloud Magic      
7. Drop Box      
8. Degoo      
9. One Drive 
   
 (UDP stream): 
_805741C9._sub._google
cast._tcp.local........... 
(UDP stream): c............cid-
59DAFF70AD928598.users.storage.live.com..... 
10. Just Cloud      
11. PCloud     (UDP stream): ;3...........binapi.pcloud.com..... And........p-par17.pcloud.com..... 
12. XXL Box 
Secure    
- - 
13. ZeroPC     (UDPstream): m<...........v1.zeropc.com..... 
14. File Manager      
15. ZipCloud 
   
 (UDP stream): 
sq..........thumbnails 
backupgrid.net..... 
16. 4Sync Cloud    .............lh5.ggpht.com..... 
_CC1AD845._sub._googlecast._tcp.local...........
............ 
_CC1AD845._sub._googlecast._tcp.local...........
............ 
17. Adobe 
Creative Cloud 
   NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 LOCATION: 
http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 
239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, 
.............cc-api-storage.adobe.io..... 
 
#............android.clients.google.com..... 
 UPnP/1.0, 
MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-
d6a5-4e47-9ae6-
1ed85ce82f5d::urn:schem
as-upnp-
org:device:InternetGate
wayDevice:1 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-
age=1800 
NT: urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:InternetGate
wayDevice:1 
 
18. Asus Web 
Storage Cloud 
   .u...........android.clients.google.com..... 
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 
Host:[FF02::C]:1900 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-org:device:MediaServer:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
19. Bitcasa Drive    . ...........bitcasa.clou
dfs.io..... 
............._googlecast._tcp.local.............
....._googlecast._tcp.local.................._go
oglecast._tcp.local.................._googlecast
._tcp.local.................._googlecast._tcp.lo
cal..... 
20. DropSend 
Android Cloud 
   M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 Host:239.255.255.250:19
00 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaServer:
1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:49860/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-
1ed85ce82f5d::urn:schemas-upnp-
org:service:Layer3Forwarding:1 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: urn:schemas-upnp-
 org:service:Layer3Forwarding:1 
21. Egnyte    .>...........decide.mixpanel.com..... 
 
.............api.mixpan
el.com..... 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-
1ed85ce82f5d::upnp:rootdevice 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: upnp:rootdevice 
22. FileBay.co 
Secure 
Storage 
   6............www.facebook.com..... 
 
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 
Host:239.255.255.250:19
00 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaRendere
r:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
 
.q...........android.clients.google.com..... 
 
`H...........r2---sn-aigl6n76.gvt1.com..... 
 
T............cdn.ywxi.net..... 
 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:49860/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
23. Foldersync 
Lite 
   ..._googlecast._tcp.local.................._go
oglecast._tcp.local. 
 
.............ssl.google
-analytics.com..... 
 
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 
HOST: 
239.255.255.250:1900 
MAN: "ssdp:discover" 
MX: 1 
ST: urn:dial-
multiscreen-
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
 org:service:dial:1 
24. IDrive Cloud 
Online Backup 
   6............evsweb16 idrivesync.com..... 
 
.I...........evs 
idrivesync.com..... 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
25. JohoSpace 
Backup – 
Restore & 
Migrate 
   .P...........www.manage.jsbackup.net..... 
 
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 
Host:[FF02::C]:1900 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaRendere
r:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
26. Mega Cloud    M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 Host:[FF02::C]:1900 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaRendere
r:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
 
27. MyCLoud 
(WD) 
   M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 HOST: 
239.255.255.250:1900 
MAN: "ssdp:discover" 
MX: 4 
ST: ssdp:all 
 
 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
 28. Pogoplug 
Cloud 
   _DC295335._sub._googlecast._tcp.local...... 
 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
29. Tesorit CLoud    .#...........lh3.ggpht.com 
connectify..... 
 
.q...........r14---sn-
aiglln6k.gvt1.com..... 
 
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 
Host:[FF02::C]:1900 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaRendere
r:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d_1 
30. Yandex Disk    M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 Host:[FF02::C]:1900 
ST:urn:schemas-upnp-
org:device:MediaRendere
r:1 
Man:"ssdp:discover" 
MX:3 
 
[&.......... 
uploader7h.disk.yandex.net..... 
NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1 
LOCATION: http://192.168.201.1:0/ 
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900 
SERVER: WINDOWS, UPnP/1.0, MicroStack/1.0.4103 
NTS: ssdp:alive 
USN: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
CACHE-CONTROL: max-age=1800 
NT: uuid:a343c163-d6a5-4e47-9ae6-1ed85ce82f5d 
 
31. Google Drive      
 
